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Abstract:

Farmers’ citizenization concerns three logical aspects. First, farmers’ viability
determines whether they can truly be citizenized and whether they can realize
scale management of rural land. Second, farmers’ viability also determines the
time for the realization of scale management of rural land and subsequently
determines the coming of the Lewis turning point and commercialization
point. Third, the key to viability’s coming into play lies in the government’s
institutional supply. Citizenization is in step with the long process of scale
management of farmland, the coming of the Lewis turning point and
commercialization point, the eventual eradication of the impact of the
household registration system, and the development of professional farmers.
Farmers’ viability is the ultimate key to such synchronized challenges. There
are two approaches to the enhancement of farmers’ viability. The first is
“to invest in farmers” and the second is to alleviate the existing household
registration system’s constraints on farmers. The first approach outweighs the
second, for its quintessential essence is to increase farmers’ per capita capital,
enhance their viability and transform China from a country with vast human
resources into a country with quality human resources.

Keywords: citizenization; viability; scale of farmland management; the Lewis turning point
and commercialization point; household registration system (hukou)

1.Introduction

I

n China, since the reform and opening up, some farmers have been engaged in
urban non-agricultural industries. Because of the dual household registration
system, these farmers, although living in urban areas, have been excluded from the
urban household registration system. Their social security, medical security and their
children’s education rights are different from “real” urban residents. Therefore, these
farmers cannot be integrated into the urban culture and lifestyle and they cannot be
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called real urban residents. But, this situation is gradually being solved and the process is referred to as the
citizenization of Chinese farmers.
On 9 January 1958, the hukou registration system (household registration system) was signed into law
and China began to restrict the flow of the rural population into urban areas, which created a two-fold system
of rural and urban areas. Under this system, each citizen was classified in an agricultural or non-agricultural
hukou (rural or urban). This system is linked to social welfare such as residency, medical, education and
pension and farmers who live in cities without urban hukou status were not qualified to receive the benefits of
urban welfare.
China’s household registration system is a system that strictly classifies urban and rural populations, and
which embodies an urban priority in resource distributions. China’s household registration system originated
from the development strategy of giving priority to heavy industry as the means to stimulate economic
growth. The household registration system has caused some negative side effects such as the unbalanced
development of urban and rural areas, the split of urban and rural markets and the consistently expanding
income gap between urban and rural areas, all of which have been harmful to the healthy development of
the Chinese economy. China acknowledged this situation in 2004 and has since promoted the granting of
urban residency to people who have moved from rural areas to cities and the cities have begun to reduce the
requirements for urban household registration.
According to the report to the 19th CPC National Congress, the five years since the 18th CPC National
Congress have seen an annual increase of 1.2% in the urbanization rate, with over 80 million people from
the agricultural population being converted to urban residents. Yet, of these 80 million emerging urban
residents, only a small proportion are now permanent urban residents. At the end of 2016, the proportion
of permanent urban residents in China reached 57.35%, including 41.20% registered residents and 16.15%
yet-to-be registered residents.① It is difficult to determine whether such a result should be attributed to the
difficulty for farmers to register their residences in urban areas or their reluctance to exchange their registered
rural residency for an urban one. What was unquestionable is the fact that the proportion of registered urban
residents was over 10 percentage points lower than that of total urban residents. In 2017 the population of
China’s rural migrant workers reached 287,000,000, threatening even tougher prospects.②
The issue of Chinese citizenization is the outcome of the times. As agricultural efficiency increases,
productivity improves. Given the large rural population base, however, the per capita land share among
Chinese farmers is very much limited. If farmers are firmly bound to their land there will be an
increasing surplus labor force in rural China making it even harder to increase farmers’ incomes. As
many farmers have swarmed to cities for work since China launched “Reform and Opening-up,” the
issue of citizenization had become more important. Farmers have been motivated to move to urban areas
for higher pay, creating problems for the cities such as their social security, medical security and their
children’s education rights.
The theoretical system of new structural economics unveils the internal link and logic among “factor
endowment, comparative advantage, development strategy, enterprises’ viability, institutional structure and

① National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. 2016 Report on the Monitoring and Survey of the Chinese Migrant Workers.
② National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. 2017 Report on the Monitoring and Survey of the Chinese Migrant Workers.

145

CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL SCIENCES No.3. 2019

development performance.”① This paper have borrowed the term “viability” from new structural economics
to interpret rural migrant workers’ development and citizenization in urban China.
Household farmland area, which is determined by productivity, determines the number of surplus rural
laborers that will become migrant workers in urban areas and thus citizenized. Per household farmland area
is just the productivity frontier that Chinese farmers can achieve, and it is this productivity that determines
the scale of surplus laborers, and these surplus laborers are the migrant workers who determine the scale of
citizenization which subsequently determines the duration of citizenization. The larger the per household
farmland area is, the higher productivity frontier the Chinese farmers can achieve; the more challenging
the citizenization task is, the longer it will last. Only when migrant farmers acquire viability for city life,
can they truly be citizenized, the transfer of surplus rural laborers to urban China be smooth, and the scale
management of farmland be advanced. Thus, migrant farmers’ viability for city life determines whether they
can be citizenized and whether scale management of farmland can be realized. This is the first logical aspect.
Only when scale management of farmland is realized can farmers enjoy higher pay, can the ruralurban revenue gap be narrowed, can professional farmers gradually emerge as the main force of agricultural
production, and can the Lewis turning point and commercialization point② successively come to pass. Thus,
viability determines the realization of scale management of farmland, which subsequently determines the
convergence of rural and urban incomes and the coming of the Lewis turning point and commercialization
point. This is the second logical aspect.
The above-mentioned two aspects do not concern the role of government. How does the government play
its role in this citizenization? How is viability related to the government? One of the government’s functions
is to satisfy society’s policy and institutional needs with corresponding supplies. This indicates that farmers
cannot acquire viability without government support. Support which is given in two approaches. The first is to
invest in farmers③ and increase farmers’ per capita capital④ to help secure viability. The second is to alleviate
or even eliminate the negative constraint of the existing household registration system on citizenization. The
purpose of eliminating the negative impact of the long-lasting rural-urban dual household registration structure
is, of course, to enhance farmers’ viability. Farmers’ acquisition of viability relies heavily on government
support. Only when corresponding institutional supplies are provided can farmers’ need for viability be
satisfied and their real viability be enhanced. With government support, farmers can acquire viability, which
brings this argument back to the first logical aspect.

2. Literature review
Given that the rural-urban dual household registration system is unique to China, overseas studies in this
regard only focus on labor mobility-related issues, without paying much attention to citizenization. Among
these studies, the most representative one is the classic theory of dualistic economy,⑤ which was based on

①
②
③
④
⑤

Lin et al., 2012, p. 3.
Fei & Ranis, 1961.
Schultz, 2006, p. 150.
Solow, 1956.
Lewis, 1954.
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Lewis’ dual-sector model,① and was later enriched and improved by other scholars.②
By contrast, Chinese scholars attach more importance to rural-urban migration, i.e. citizenization, apart
from the classic theory of dualistic economy and pure population mobility. Their studies mainly target the
remaining issues caused by the previously implemented urban-rural dual household registration system. It
is fair to say that this unique Chinese system impaired the stimulus of population migration.③ This system
generates repulsive interactions through two approaches. The first is the 1958 Household Registration Law
of the PRC, which shaped rural population’s negative expectations of their citizenization. The second is
established urban residents’ negative attitude toward rural-urban migration, which was expressed by means of
votes and complaints. The two approaches were combined to impair the stimulus of population migration.
In addition to “land-tied” issues, the Chinese household registration system has also brought about a series
of other challenges to citizenization, such as high property prices, poor living conditions④ and their children’s
limited access to schooling.⑤ These existing problems have hampered the development of farmers’ viability in
varied degrees.
There are abundant papers and research data on citizenization. Without exception they focus on how
to enable citizenization in a more convenient way, while paying scant attention to the core role of farmers’
viability during the process of citizenization.

3. Farmers’ viability and citizenization
Whether farmers can be successfully citizenized depends primarily on their viability. Suppose without any
subsidy from the government for citizenization, Chinese farmers can still find a job in cities, purchase houses,
settle down, and transform from low-end part-time workers to professional industrial workers; subsequently,
they no longer rely on rural land for survival; instead, they can transfer their “three land rights” (ownership,
contracting right and management right), along with a package of rural homestead-related rights, to others
and become permanent urban residents. The satisfaction of the assumed conditions means farmers already
have the capability to live and develop in cities. They have developed corresponding viability. Farmers with
viability do not need any government subsidy or favorable policy for citizenization. Only when farmers are
capable of citizenizing themselves can citizenization be sustainable. All relevant work should revolve around
how to enhance migrant workers’ viability in cities.
Yet, there are prerequisites for farmers with such viability to be successfully citizenized. First, nonagricultural industries should be developed well enough to absorb the population shifted from agricultural.
Take the USA as a counter-example. In the actual process of labor mobility, however, for a time the natural
growth in rural-urban migration was beyond the in-take capacity of local urban industries in low-income
agriculture-dominated regions of the USA⑥. As a result, such low-income agriculture-dominated regions

①
②
③
④
⑤
⑥

Lewis, 1954.
Jorgenson, 1967; Todaro, 1969; Fei & Ranis, 1975.
Li, 2003.
Chen, 2004.
Xu, 2008; Gao, 2013.
Bachmura, 1959
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could not reach the average productivity level of US agriculture and therefore could not realize income
convergence.① Thus it can be seen, citizenization cannot be achieved unless corresponding prerequisites are
satisfied.
Second, there is no twisted government policy hindering citizenization, for which farmers can step by
step complete the division of labor according to their comparative advantages. Regarding this, China used
to implement a rigid household registration system, which restricted farmers (including those not good at
agricultural work) to their rural hometown. Yet, they were not allowed to go to cities for non-agricultural
work, let alone to become permanent urban residents.

4. Viability, citizenization and scale management of farmland
Why do farmers migrate from rural China to urban China for permanent urban residency? It is imperative
to carry out a thought experiment for a clearer picture of citizenization. How could Robinson Crusoe be
citizenized when he lived alone on a deserted island? Was there any need for him to be citizenized? He did
not need it; nor could he be. Given that there was no one but Crusoe on the deserted island, he must shoulder
a range of tasks (grain production, garment making, etc.) and barely had time to think about anything else. He
was a farmer in the first place. Likewise, before the food supply was sufficient for all, agriculture production
remained a top priority. Judging from this thought experiment, citizenization is the outcome of the division of
labor, while the division of labor in turn promotes citizenization.
There is no possibility for a 100% citizenization rate. Eventually, urban expansion is determined by
two primary factors. One is a continuous decrease in the surplus labor force; the other is the relative price
increase of agricultural products. Inflexible land supply in the agricultural sector can eventually hinder
urban development by means of food prices and actual income decreases. The ultimate citizenization rate is
determined by the scale of rural-urban labor transfers, which is determined by the optimal farmland scale of
agricultural management. The maximum scale of manageable farmland determines the population of the rural
labor force to be migrated to cities. The larger the manageable farmland is, the bigger the number of the rural
laboring population that will be migrated to cities. The stronger farmers’ viability grows, the faster the labor
migration becomes, the earlier citizenization is completed, and the sooner the scale management of farmland
is realized. Thus, citizenization is in full accord with the scale management of farmland. When citizenization
is completed, the scale management of farmland should also be realized. The key to the success of such tasks
lies in farmers’ viability. The determinants of farmland scale are shown in the following formula.

farmsize =

laborprductivity
landproductivity

②

(1)

Farmland scale is determined by labor productivity / land productivity ratio (specific value). If labor
productivity is improved while land productivity is given, the management scale of farmland should be on
the rise. This paper assumes that the denominator (land productivity) is given, while the numerator (labor

① Bachmura, 1959
② Eastwood, Lipton & Newell, 2010, pp. 3323-3397.
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productivity) is increasing.①
Ni Guohua and Cai Fang (2015) studied the scale of land management needed by farmers and even
drew a decision-making atlas concerning the scale of agricultural management,② according to which, the
concentration of landholding is sure to be a long process. This analysis is based on the research results of that
decision-making atlas. Admittedly, no direct connection has been found between family management and
the scale of farmland management. However, family management, benefiting from strong ties among family
members, does not incur monitoring costs, for which their transaction expenses③ can drop to an ideal level.
Given that, this paper studies agricultural management in the unit of rural household.
Based on the variation of data concerning agricultural labor and rural labor,④ this paper roughly estimates
the duration of citizenization and realization of scale farmland management. See Table 1.
Table 1 Rural Labor Force vs. Agricultural Labor Force
Rural & urban employee caliber
Year

Rural labor force

Agricultural labor force

Agricultural labor proportion %

1978
1982

30638

28318

92.42770416

33867

30853

91.10048129

1986

37990

31254

82.26901816

1988

40067

32197

80.35790052

1990

47708

38914

81.56703278

1991

48026

39098

81.41006955

1992

48291

38699

80.13708559

1993

48546

37680

77.61710543

1994

48802

36628

75.05430105

1995

49025

35530

72.47322794

1996

49028

34820

71.02064127

1997

49039

34840

71.0454944

1998

49021

35177

71.75904204

1999

48982

35768

73.02274305

2000

48934

36043

73.65635346

2001

48674

36399

74.78119735

2002

48121

36640

76.14139357

2003

47506

36204

76.20932093

2004

46971

34830

74.15213642

2005

46258

33442

72.29452203

2006

45348

31941

70.43530034

2007

44368

30731

69.26388388

① Land productivity may also be on a gradual rise during the process of citizenization. For example, farmers may be equipped with biotechnology and installation
agriculture technology, which help increase per unit output of farmland. If so, the scale management of farmland will decrease accordingly; so will the quantity
of the labor force and the pressure of citizenization. In that case, citizenization will be achieved sooner than expected. To avoid logical contradictions, this
paper assumes that only productivity should be improved.
② Ni & Cai, 2015, p. 169.
③ Coase, 1960.
④ Data source: China Statistical Yearbook-2017 (including data as of the end of 2016).
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Rural & urban employee caliber
Year

Rural labor force

Agricultural labor force

Agricultural labor proportion %

2008

43461

29923

68.85023354

2009

42506

28890

67.96687526

2010

41418

27931

67.4368632

2011

40506

26594

65.65447094

2012

39602

25773

65.08004646

2013

38737

24171

62.39770762

2014

37943

22790

60.06377988

2015

37041

21919

59.17496828

2016

36175

21496

59.45183505

Data source: China Statistical Yearbook-2017
Data source notes: The first, second and third lines were retrieved from China Statistical Yearbook-2017. The first
column exhibits the consecutive years from 1990 to 2016; the second column exhibits the corresponding rural
labor force (not necessarily engaged in agricultural production); the third column exhibits the agricultural labor
force (i.e. labor force totally engaged in agricultural production); the fourth column exhibits the proportion of the
agricultural labor force to the rural labor force. A linear estimation is made based on the changes in the proportion
of the agricultural labor force to the rural labor force and from this estimation an ideal agricultural population is
calculated.① This is the calculation method of this part. The calculation of farmland area should be based on China’s
“red line” of arable land, i.e. 1.8 billion mu (c. 296.5265 million acres) arable land minimum.

By the end of 2016, China’s agricultural population was 215 million people. Given the 1.8 billion mu of
arable land, suppose there are three laborers per rural household;② to reach the target of a 30 mu farm per
household,③ there is only a needed population of 180 million agricultural laborers, which means an excess
of 35 million laborers that can be transferred. If taking the rural laboring population of 2016 as the base,④
the proportion of the agricultural labor force after the labor transfer should be 49.8%, of which 16.3% more
needs to be transferred from agricultural production to other sectors to fulfill the target of a 30 mu farm per
household.
As shown in Table 3, a simple moving average is adopted to predict the change in proportion of the
agricultural population. More specifically, by figuring out the average reduction rate of the agricultural
population proportion over the 26-year time span from 1990 to 2016, this paper obtains the needed time for the
reduction of the agricultural population proportion to 49.8%.
This 26 year period (1990-2016) saw the proportion of the agricultural population reduced by 22.1%,
an annual reduction of 0.85%. That means it will take 19.2 years from 2016 to have the proportion of the
agricultural population reduced by 16.3% by 2035. Thus, the target of a 30 mu farm per rural household will
not be achieved until 2035.

① This is not to say the population transferred from agricultural production to other sectors were all citizenized. Instead, it means those transferred were no
longer engaged in agricultural production. They might not become permanent urban residents, yet they were no longer “farmers” in essence, either. After all,
professionally speaking, people not engaged in agricultural production cannot be regarded as farmers.
② Generally speaking, the agricultural cycle consists of a busy season and a slack season. A typical rural household has two laborers, i.e. husband and wife.
During busy season, however, they may hire a temporary worker, giving rise to employment-based agricultural management. Under such circumstances, there
are three laborers in a rural household.
③ This is based on the research findings of Ni Guohua, et al. (2015) on the decision-making atlas concerning the scale of agricultural management.
④ The calculation is based on China’s rural population in 2016. Judging from historical data, the rural labor population has been on the decline; however, the
introduction of the two-child policy blurs the variation trend of the rural labor population, for which this paper assumes the rural agricultural population is
given and unchanged.
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How long will it take to achieve the target of a 200 mu farm per rural household? Again, suppose the rural
household has three laborers; this target means a 67 mu per capita farm, a needed agricultural population of
26,900,000, and a surplus agricultural population of 185,000,000 to be transferred elsewhere. Again, taking the
2016 population of the rural labor force as the base,① and assuming fertility and mortality remain unchanged,
the 30 million agricultural population accounts for 7.44% of the total labor force, which means 52.01% of the
existing rural labor force will need to be transferred elsewhere. If the annual transferred proportion is 0.85%, it
will take 61 years to complete transferring the abovementioned 52.01% of the existing agricultural population.
It can be expected that 60 years after 2016, i.e. by 2078,② the target of a 200 mu per household farmland area
will be achieved.
Citizenization synchronizes with the promotion of agricultural scale management. The maximum
manageable farmland determines the rural laboring population to be migrated to cities. The larger the
manageable farmland area is, the greater the number of rural laborers that will need to be migrated to
the cities. The key to the success of such tasks lies in the farmers’ viability. Without viability, none of the
abovementioned targets can be smoothly achieved. With sufficient viability, farmers can realize scale
management and complete citizenization ahead of schedule.

5. Viability, citizenization and the Lewis turning point
It will be about half a century before rural China can realize a per household farmland of 200 mu which
means there will be half a century-long journey of citizenization before approaching the commercialization
point.③ During this period of transition, part-time rural households will become an inevitable form of
existence. Such a large proportion of part-time rural households indicate various challenges, including sharp
contradiction between man and land, migrant workers’ insufficient urban viability, the underdevelopment of
urban sectors, and the invisibility of the Lewis turning point and commercialization point.
The part-time rural household model is not one developed after the coming of the Lewis turning point,
or one continuing to exist when reaching the commercialization point, or one extensively adopted by
developed countries. Even so, the part-time rural household model is an inevitable choice for China during
its urbanization. Chinese rural households have to undergo a transition from traditional rural households,
through part-time rural households, to professional rural households. During citizenization, the part-time rural
household will be the primary model, while after citizenization, the professional rural household will dominate
rural China. Professional rural households will be fully engaged in efficient modern agriculture. These rural
households thus become professional farmers. These professional farmers are not stimulated to join in the tide
of citizenization. In this sense, citizenization is a process of eliminating farmers not suitable for agricultural
production and a process featuring a rational flow of factor resources. Rural China will no longer be a place

① The calculation is based on China’s rural population in 2016. Judging from historical data, rural labor population is on the decline; however, the introduction
of the two-child policy blurs the variation trend of the rural labor population, for which this paper assumes the rural agricultural population is given and
unchanged.
② However, technological progress is undoubtedly accelerated, which will help accelerate the transfer of the surplus labor force from agricultural production to
other non-agricultural sectors. It is thus concluded that citizenization should be completed sooner than the author of this paper initially expected.
③ Fei & Ranis, 1961
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from which rural people scramble to flee. With a balanced distribution of factors in rural and urban China,
there will be no substantial gap in people’s livelihoods , rural China will no longer be tormented by disguised
unemployment or a surplus labor force, and the commercialization point will be reached sometime around
2078① right after the coming of the Lewis turning point.
A major challenge facing China now is that many aged and some young rural migrant workers do not have
sufficient urban viability, and thus they cannot find a proper job in the cities and subsequently have to return
to their rural hometowns for agricultural production. The already arrived “Lewis turning point”,② according
to the academic circles, is as unstable as a rolling bead on a sloping board, which can from time to time roll
back to the “original point.” This is the characteristics of the “Lewis turning point” in China. The convergence
of migrant workers’ and college graduates’ income,③ along with migrant workers’ returning to rural China,
indicates that the Lewis turning point has already arrived. Such a “back-flow,” however, can only be deemed
the “earlier-than-expected withdrawal of migrant workers”.④ Migrant workers’ insufficient viability prevents
them from becoming permanent urban residents and they thus remain passers-by. After all, however long rural
migrant workers live in “villages-in-town,” they will not automatically become permanent urban residents
in a real sense. The so-called “villages-in-town” (also known as urban villages) refers to villages that appear
on both the outskirts and in the downtown areas of major Chinese cities. They are in a way the outcome of
urbanization with the sacrifice of life quality of rural migrant workers with insufficient viability, who can
only afford to live there and are engaged in providing less productive and efficient services.⑤ The real reason
behind migrant workers’ “back-flow” lies in their insufficient viability. Apart from viability, there is also a
need for growth in the modern sectors, without which the surplus labor force from the traditional sectors, such
as agricultural production, will not be easily absorbed.
This paper estimates the population of surplus agricultural laborers based on the agricultural production
scale of farmland. When scale management of farmland is realized, the surplus agricultural labor force will
disappear, and the Lewis turning point⑥ and the commercialization point⑦ will successively arrive. This is in
nature an analysis of citizenization from the perspective of farmers’ professional attributes. Again, this paper

①
②
③
④
⑤

Calculated based on the data from China Statistical Yearbook-2017.
Cai, 2010
Cai, 2010
Fan, 2015
Overall, the average urbanization rate of Third World countries does not catch up with their average industrialization rate, although their industrialization
and urbanization rates cannot compare with those of developed countries. In China, however, there is a different picture. Industrial tasks in many cities are
primarily taken by migrant workers, who are not permanent registered residents in cities and are virtually passers-by there. For this reason, China features
an excessively high rate of industrialization/urbanization. The nature of the labor market is thus transformed by the influx of migrant workers and can no
longer be cleared by modern divisions with higher pay. Urban service sectors creates a large number of low-income jobs, which give rise to the emergence of
less-efficient services. This indicates that the average industrialization-urbanization rate is relatively low in Third-World countries according to traditional
standards. If this relatively low ratio proves to be correct, workers’ income in urban service sectors (particularly irregular services) should be determined by the
influx of migrant workers, and should be fairly low.
⑥ Lewis, 1954.
⑦ Fei & Ranis, 1975. That is to say a commercialization point lies in every type of productivity. In the context of a closed economy, the timing of the
commercialization point varies from country to country. If agricultural productivity can reach 1,000 mu farmland per rural household by 2078, the arrival of
the commercialization point will accordingly be suspended. Thus, what truly matters to society is the effectiveness of division of labor, the optimization of
consumption structure, the sustainability of existing consumption model and the fairness of income distribution on the premise of efficiency. There will be
another half a century before citizenization is completed. This is in fact a rather optimistic estimation, which requires steady growth of the macro-economy, a
continuous increase in urban jobs, gradual elimination of outdated production facilities, progressive easing of the ever-widening “rich-poor gap,” and a joyous
transition to a demographic dividend-reliant society from an aging society. A brand-new society in a few decades is worth anticipation. Yet, the transitional
period from now until then must be supplemented with part-time rural work.
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concludes the analysis through Adam Smith’s division of labor, that professional farmers are an inevitable
outcome of labor division and that the citizenized population are the “drop-offs” of agricultural production
during the process of labor division. When farmers’ viability is not sufficient the seemingly already
approached Lewis turning point cannot be stabilized, the commercialization point is not foreseeable, and the
challenge of citizenization cannot be thoroughly tackled.

6. Viability, citizenization and the government’s role
The government’s institutional supply determines whether such viability can be enhanced. The
government plays a leading role in this regard. As is known, the government is supposed to satisfy society’s
policy and institutional demand with policy and institutional supply. This indicates that farmers cannot acquire
viability without government support. Such support is given in two approaches. The first is to invest in farmers
and increase their per capita capital① to help secure viability. The second is to alleviate or even eliminate the
negative constraint of the existing household registration system on citizenization. The elimination of the
negative impact of the long-lasting rural-urban dual household registration structure is, of course, to enhance
farmers’ viability. Farmers’ acquisition of viability relies heavily on policy and institutional support from the
government and with government support, farmers can acquire viability, which brings this argument back to
the first logical aspect.
Regarding citizenization, the government should take the lead to give more policy support (e.g. injecting
more investments), which can directly enhance farmers’ viability; meanwhile, it should also ensure
institutional supply to enhance their viability in an indirect way. The number of determinants and constraints
are in inverse proportion to farmer’ viability. To enhance farmers’ viability and promote citizenization, it
is necessary to gradually unleash the constraints on farmers. For example, adjustments should be made in
relevant interests and benefits attached to registered residences.
Citizenization will remain a “wishful” policy objective unless migrant workers can have their urban
viability significantly enhanced so the government should attach more importance to the enhancement of
farmers’ viability. There are two approaches to the improvement of farmers’ viability. The first is “to invest in
farmers”② and increase their per capita capital③ to improve farmers’ employability skills in non-agricultural
sectors. The other is to alleviate the existing household registration system’s constraints on farmers. The
three points mentioned earlier in this paper are to alleviate such constraints on farmers. Of course the first
approach should outweigh the second. After all, only when farmers’ per capita capital④ is increased can capital
deepening occur⑤ and only when capital is deepened can migrant workers have their viability truly enhanced.

①
②
③
④
⑤

Solow, 1956.
Schultz, 2006, p. 150.
Solow, 1956.
Solow, 1956.
Solow, 1956.
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7. Conclusions
Citizenization in China concerns three logical aspects.
First, farmers’ viability determines whether they can be citizenized and whether scale management of
farmland can be realized. The area of per household farmland determines the scale of the citizenization task
and subsequently determines the duration of citizenization. Only when farmers acquire viability can they truly
be citizenized, the transfer of surplus rural laborers to urban China be smooth and the scale management of
farmland be advanced.
Second, viability determines the realization of scale management of farmland, which subsequently
determines the convergence of rural and urban incomes and the coming of the Lewis turning point and the
commercialization point. Only when scale management of farmland is realized can farmers enjoy higher
pay and the rural-urban revenue gap be narrowed, and the Lewis turning point and commercialization point
successively be realized.
Third, the government’s institutional supply determines whether such viability can be enhanced. The first
two logical aspects of citizenization do not concern the government. Nevertheless, farmers’ acquisition of
viability requires policy support from the government which is given in two approaches. The first is to invest
in farmers①, increase farmers’ per capita capital② and thus help secure viability. The second is to alleviate
or even eliminate the negative constraint of the existing household registration system on citizenization. The
elimination of the negative impact of the long-lasting rural-urban dual household registration structure is, of
course, to enhance farmers’ viability. With government support, farmers can acquire viability, which brings
this argument back to the first logical aspect.
Only with viability can citizenization be sustainable and be achieved without extra effort. All relevant
work should revolve around how to enhance migrant workers’ viability in cities. Yet, there are prerequisites for
farmers with such viability to be successfully citizenized. First, non-agricultural sectors should be developed
well enough to absorb the population shifted from the agricultural sector.③ Second, there is no twisted
government policy hindering citizenization, for which farmers can step by step complete and optimize the
division of labor according to their comparative advantages.④
Government policy should focus on how to enhance farmers’ viability. There are two approaches to
the enhancement of farmers’ viability. The first approach is “to invest in farmers”⑤ to improve farmers’
employment skills in non-agricultural sectors. The other is to alleviate the existing household registration
system’s constraints on farmers. In contrast, the first approach outweighs the second, because only an
economic growth accompanied with a per capita capital growth can be identified as capital deepening.⑥
Only when capital is deepened can farmers’ viability be enhanced. The endogenous growth model proposed

① Schultz, 2006, p. 150.
② Solow, 1956
③ Take the USA as a counter-example. In the actual process of labor mobility, however, for a time the natural growth in rural-urban migration was beyond the
in-take capacity of local urban industries in low-income agriculture-dominated regions of the USA (Frank T. Bachmura, 1959). As a result, such low-income
agriculture-dominated regions could not reach the average productivity level of US agriculture and therefore could not realize income convergence (Frank T.
Bachmura, 1959). Thus, their rural-urban population migration was hampered.
④ Unfortunately, China used to implement a rigid household registration system, which strictly restricted farmers to their rural hometown, including those not
good at agricultural work. Yet, they were not allowed to go to cities for non-agricultural work.
⑤ Schultz, 2006, p. 150
⑥ Solow, 1956
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by economists, along with the investment in human capital and the introduction of cutting-edge technology
emphasized by total factor productivity, has testified the necessity of Schultz’s calling for “investing in
farmers.”① The quintessential essence of investing in farmers is to increase farmers’ per capita capital②,
enhance their viability and transform China into a country with quality human resources from a country with
vast human resources.
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